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OFFICE OF THE UMPIRE No. B-16 October 10, 1941
Termination of Employment Because of Extended Absence
GRIEVANCE: Linden -- Case No. 3 "I claim I was discharged without cause. Due to the fact that I had my wife phone the company of my absence."
Umpire's Decision: 1. The notice of S's absence was undoubtedly defective but, in the judgment of the Umpire, a "satisfactory reason" has been provided in explanation. It is held, therefore, that S's seniority was not broken by application of Part (c) of Paragraph 64 of the Agreement of June 3, 1941. 2. S's extended absence, without securing a Leave of Absence, was improper and represented a violation of Shop Rules respecting regular attendance and a failure to meet his responsibilities as an employee. For the consequent loss of employment from May 23, 1941 to October 20, 1941, S must bear full responsibility and such loss is construed as a disciplinary layoff. This establishes no precedent, however, as respects appropriate penalties for such cases. 3. S is reinstated on his regular job, without loss of seniority as of October 20, 1941. (Entire Decision should be read)
In the Matter of: United Automobile Workers of America -- C.I.O. Local 595 and General Motors Corporation -- Linden Division -- Case No. 3 On June 23, 1941, the following grievance was presented on behalf of S.: "I claim I was discharged without cause. Due to the fact that I had my wife phone the company of my absence." A hearing on the matter was held in Philadelphia on October 1, 1941.
Nature of Case On April 25, 1941, S. was absent from work and no reason was given. He was again absent on April 29 on which day his wife notified management that the absence was because of a "sick brother." A second notification in explanation of S.'s continued absence was given by S.'s wife on May 5 when she reported that an "uncle had died in Pennsylvania" but that S. would report back to work in a week or so. Because of the apparent inadequacy of these reasons, the Employment Department investigated and states it found that the employee was serving a 30-day jail sentence for driving while under the influence of liquor. Management says that "on May 6, a release was effected and another man hired to take S.'s place" on the ground that S. was absent for more than three days without advancing a proper reason. S. reported in person to the Employment Office on May 23 and at first failed to give the real reason for his absence. Management states that S. was then informed "when he had failed to give a satisfactory reason for his absence, he had been considered as having quit his job and a release to that effect had been put through on May 6th." S. was told that there was no work available at the time but that he would be considered for a job when a future opening occurred. The grievance in this case was filed on behalf of S. by his district committeeman, it being contended that management's action represented a discharge without cause. Position of Corporation The Corporation points out that "when an employee is hired on a job, he assumes certain responsibilities toward the conduct of such job... When it is necessary for an employee to be absent from work for any reason, the employer has a right to expect notification regarding the absence and the reason for same." It is further urged that "efficiency of operations and production could not be maintained if employees were allowed to be absent for indefinite periods without proper notification." In the present case, S. had been absent for six consecutive working days when his tenure was terminated. Although it received notice that he would be absent, management claims that no satisfactory reason for the absence had been advanced and that there was no proper notification as to how long the absence would continue. It is contended, therefore, that S. lost his right to a job pursuant to Paragraph 64 (c) under which seniority is broken: "If the employee is absent for three working days without properly notifying the Management, unless a satisfactory reason is given." Management maintains that a satisfactory reason for the absence was not given and that the notice was not proper or correct. It is argued, therefore, that S.'s seniority was broken when he was absent for more than three days. Had the employee submitted the proper reason for the absence and asked for a Leave of Absence, management says, "undoubtedly proper arrangements could have been made." Management says, however, that "he chose subterfuge and, in so doing, his supervision had no chance to rearrange the work or secure replacement without releasing him and hiring another man in his place." Union Contention The Union emphasizes that management was actually notified on several occasions that S. would be unable to return to work and was aware of his unavailability for employment. It is said in the Union brief that "Mrs. S. did not give the real reason for S.'s absence through fear that, if management learned the true facts, it would jeopardize his standing with the Corporation and because she was ashamed to admit that her husband was in jail." The Union contends "that management imposed a penalty upon S. that was far too severe under the circumstances." While admitting that S. was responsible for an irregularity which cannot be condoned, the Union insists that management erred in applying Paragraph 64 to cause an automatic break in S.'s seniority. This break in seniority was effected, stated the Union, when management held S. responsible for "being absent from work without a satisfactory reason." The Union maintains, however, that the "satisfactory reason" angle to Paragraph 64 is not applicable to the present case but has been incorporated "for the protection of those employees who might be absent for three or more days without notifying management." This part of Paragraph 64 has no bearing on this case, claims the Union, since S. arranged for notification to management of his absence within three days. The Union admits that S. did not meet his obligation as an employee but maintains that his action is not covered by Paragraph 64. Opinion and Decision of the Umpire Management states that the issue in this case "is the release of S. for being absent from work without permission and without a satisfactory reason" as required by Paragraph 64 of the June 3, 1941 Agreement. Under Part (c) of Paragraph 64, an employee's seniority is broken if he is absent for three working days without properly notifying the Management. An exception to the requirement just stated is provided by the same clause when it states "unless a satisfactory reason is given." Under this paragraph, an employee who is absent for three working days or more assures retention of his seniority by notifying management on the third day of absence. The required "proper notification" clearly includes a statement of the reason for the absence and its likely duration. Both factors are important to management in the conduct of the business. In the absence of proper notification as outlined, an employee's seniority is nevertheless not broken if he later advances a "satisfactory reason" to explain his failure to give such notice. This is the clear meaning of the clause as it is written and it is not proper to extend the coverage of that clause. In the present case, management was actually notified that S. would be absent. The notification was clearly defective, however, as respects the reason advanced for the absence and the likely duration of the absence. Under Paragraph 64, S.'s seniority would therefore be broken because of the lack of proper notification "unless a satisfactory reason is given" for this situation. The defect in the notice of absence resulted because it was given by S.'s wife while S. was not at liberty. She was obviously beset with unexpected and serious troubles. In the midst of them, and not knowing how best to proceed, she gave a report to management that is quite understandable under the circumstances. If she made a mistake, it was a very human error. These circumstances, in the judgment of the Umpire, provide a "satisfactory reason" for the defect in the notice. It is concluded, therefore, that the technical defect in the notice of absence that was given does not result in a break of seniority under the terms of Part (c) of Paragraph 64. It is ruled, therefore, that S.'s seniority was not broken by application of Paragraph 64. This does not mean that S. met his responsibilities in this case. By not seeing to it that someone requested a leave of absence for him for the definite period when he would be unavailable, S. failed to meet his obligation as an employee. Under Paragraph 101 it is provided that "a leave of absence may be granted for personal reasons for a period not to exceed thirty days..." By failing to proceed under this clause, the extended absence of S. constituted a violation of Shop Rules regarding regular attendance. Such violation resulted from his own negligence. It is held, therefore, that loss of employment by S. from May 23 to October 20, 1941 constitutes a disciplinary layoff for his contributory negligence which constitutes a violation of Shop Rules. It is also held that S. is to be reinstated on his regular job without loss of seniority as of October 20, 1941. The time lost by S. is not to be construed as establishing any precedent as respects appropriate penalties in such cases. Under all the circumstances of this particular case, the contributory negligence of S. is considered by the Umpire to be of such a nature as to require this employee to bear the mentioned loss of employment. In reinstating S. to his job, the Umpire calls attention to certain fundamental aspects of this case. S. did make a grave mistake as respects his personal conduct and has paid the penalty exacted for his error. To deprive S. of his job on a technicality concerning the giving of the notice of his absence would actually result in the imposition of a second and much more severe penalty because of his personal shortcoming. Such pyramiding of penalty is neither equitable nor realistic since S. still has to work for a living for himself and his family. As a matter of fact, his employment is now the more important in order to assist in getting him back onto the right track. Under all these circumstances, the Umpire is of the firm conviction that while S. should bear the responsibility for his loss of work because he failed to secure a leave of absence, his seniority should not be considered broken since that could be effected only by a technical and highly doubtful interpretation of Paragraph 64. Decision
Signed GEORGE W. TAYLOR UMPIRE October 10, 1941. |