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OFFICE OF THE UMPIRE No. B-39 December 8, 1941 Disciplinary Layoff
GRIEVANCE: Pontiac Motor -- Case B-8 "Laid off one week because I laid off July 2 and 3, 1941 and after the foreman promised me those days off. I ask pay for the time off." Umpire's Decision
In the Matter of: United Automobile Workers of America -- C.I.O. -- Local No. 653 and General Motors Corporation -- Pontiac Motors Division -- Case No. 8-B. The grievance in this case was presented on July 7, 1941 and reads:
Nature of Case The claimant, employee W., is classified as a Pipe Fitter in the Maintenance Department. There are 13 pipe-fitters on W.'s shift, 10 of whom had definite assignments as floormen. The other 3 employees, including W., did not have definite assignments but were given miscellaneous pipe-fitting jobs and were also used to replace any of the 10 pipe-fitters operating as floormen who might be absent or on leave. On June 26, 1941, W. asked his foreman for permission to be away from work on July 2 and 3, 1941. Management says "the foreman at that time told employee W. that he thought it could be arranged but he did not make a definite promise." The Union contends that "W. had been promised by the foreman to be allowed time off on July 2nd and 3rd" and, therefore, made definite arrangements for a trip. On June 29, 1941, one of the pipe-fitters, who is regularly assigned to floor work, was given permission to take time off because of a serious illness of his mother. One of the group of 3 pipe-fitters used for miscellaneous work was assigned to the temporary vacancy, thus reducing the number of men available for miscellaneous or emergency pipe-fitting work. In view of the above-outlined situation, the foreman discussed the matter with W. on Monday, June 30. The foreman states he then told W. "that it would not be possible to grant him the leave which he had requested on June 26 to be away from work on July 2 and 3." Employee W. insists that, on the contrary, the foreman merely asked him on June 30 "to see whether or not he could cancel his trip and make other arrangements." The Union emphasizes that on June 30 the foreman did not definitely instruct W. to come to work on the 2nd and 3rd and that W. had no reason to believe the foreman intended to revoke the leave. W. did check into the possibility of making other arrangements as requested, states the Union, and found that they could not readily be changed. When he came to work on July 1, therefore, the Union says that W. had every reason to believe he would be off on the 2nd and the 3rd. The Union states that on Tuesday, July 1, toward the end of the night shift, the foreman again raised the question of whether or not W. would report to work on July 2nd and 3rd. Management reports that W. says "he had been granted permission to be off on July 2 and 3 and that he was going regardless of what the foreman said at this time." The Union states that the insistence of W. was natural since he could not possibly cancel his arrangements for his trip at the last moment. At any event, the foreman then told W. that his failure to report on July 2 and 3 would result in a disciplinary penalty upon a return to work. Management states that W. then "repeated his statement that he was going and continued by saying he would see whether or not he would be disciplined when he returned to work on Monday, July 7." W. did not take up the matter with his committeeman nor did he file a grievance even though the foreman had made his position very clear. Employee W. did not report for work on either July 2 or 3 and, when he returned to work on July 7, he was given a disciplinary layoff of one week "for not reporting to work as instructed by his foreman." In the present case, the employee and the Union appeal this layoff. Corporation Position Management contends that employee W. was properly instructed by his foreman to report for work on July 2 and 3, 1941, and W. nevertheless chose not to report on these days. His actions, claims the Corporation, constitute insubordination and violation of the shop rules. This matter is considered by management to be particularly serious because his services were necessary. The Corporation refers to Umpire Decision A-63 for support of its contention that "employees should follow the instructions of their foreman and may appeal decisions which are felt to be infringements of their personal rights rather than decide the matter for themselves." In disciplining employee W., the Corporation contends that Pontiac Motor Division was properly exercising its responsibility under Paragraph 8 of the June 3, 1941 Agreement which reserves to management the right to "discipline for cause." Union Contention The Union contends that "this is not a simple case of an employee refusing to obey a foreman's order." On the contrary, the Union feels that the incident represents an unjustified revocation of a leave, made by the foreman at the last moment, so that the employee was not able to change the plans he had made. A definite permission for W. to take off was given, states the Union, by the foreman on June 26. This fact is substantiated, according to the Union, (a) by the foreman's asking W. on June 30 "to see if he could make other arrangements" and (b) by the foreman's request of W. to be back by July 7 to take another man's place. The Union feels it is only reasonable to conclude that W. had definite permission for the leave. It is the position of the Union "that the foreman, having made the promise, should live up to the promise unless the employee was willing to make other arrangements." In view of the personal commitments made by W., the Union feels that management was entirely arbitrary in ignoring its responsibilities in the matter as well as the necessities of the employee. This seems particularly the case to the Union in view of its belief that W.'s services were no more necessary on July 2 and 3 than on other days when less men were working in the group. The Union also emphasizes that the penalty in question was wholly unreasonable in view of the fact that, prior to this incident, W. had only been off work no more than several days in seven years. The Union request that W. be paid back pay for time lost as a result of the disciplinary layoff in question. Opinion and Decision of the Umpire A review of the evidence leads to the conclusion that, on July 26, the foreman definitely agreed to W.'s request for time off on July 2 and 3. The real question at issue is whether or not management later had a right to revoke the leave which had been granted. Common sense indicates that management action to revoke such a leave should not be by the summary issuance of an arbitrary order at the last minute but by a mutual consideration of mutual problems. This is particularly true of the present case in which a minimum of notice was given to the employee and where a lack of consideration was given by management to the employee's problem. He had made extensive plans on the basis of a leave granted by management. It is the opinion of the Umpire that management did not seek clearly to revoke the leave until July 1. This means that W. cannot be held responsible for failing to use the established grievance procedure, prior to July 1, in order to handle his case in an orderly manner. The Umpire feels that, in a technical sense, W. did not follow the foreman's instructions in the present case. On the other hand, the foreman's conduct of this case was exceedingly ill-advised. If he felt it necessary to have W. report for work on July 2 and 3, after having previously given him permission to be off, one would logically expect that a matter of some urgency in the plant was involved. In the judgment of the Umpire, the unforeseen absence of another pipe-fitter did not justify the revocation of W.'s leave by the simple issuance of an order that failed to take W.'s commitments into account and which ignored the foreman's earlier promise. One cannot fail to be impressed with the arbitrariness of the foreman's approach. This is particularly evident since the department was not faced with a highly unusual method of operation, because of the absence of two men, since three men are regularly employed for filling in on absences and for emergencies. By the terms of Paragraph 47 of the June 3, 1941 Agreement "the Corporation delegates to the Umpire full discretion in cases of violation of shop rules." In the present case, W. was given a one-week disciplinary layoff on the ground that he violated a Shop Rule in failing to follow the instructions of a foreman. It is the judgment of the Umpire that W.'s failure to follow the instructions in question did represent a technical violation of the Shop Rules. Under the unusual circumstances of this case, however, the layoff of one week was wholly unreasonable and failed to take into account either the foreman's part in creating the incident or the foreman's arbitrary handling of the case. It is held that W.'s responsibility in the matter was confined to a failure to file a grievance or to notify his committeeman of the foreman's statement on July 1 of an intent to impose a disciplinary layoff. Such a procedure would have permitted discussions on the question of whether or not violation of a foreman's orders was involved. It is the absence of this procedure on W.'s part that lends some substance to the claim that he arbitrarily ignored a foreman's order. An evaluation of the various factors of the case, however, leads to a conclusion that the layoff penalty imposed on W. should not equitably exceed one day. He is, therefore, to be reimbursed with back wages for all the time lost by him as a result of the disciplinary layoff except for the first day of that layoff. This decision is necessary since management's handling of the case was ill-advised and because the one-week layoff penalty was so unduly disproportionate to the violation of Shop Rules that was in question. Decision
Signed GEORGE W. TAYLOR, UMPIRE December 8, 1941 |