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OFFICE OF THE UMPIRE No. B-45 december 4, 1941 Disciplinary Layoff
GRIEVANCE: Saginaw Malleable -- Case B-1 "Unfair penalty -- I ask that I be paid for two days I was unfairly penalized."
Umpire's Decision: 1. The two day disciplinary layoff imposed upon P. represented a rigid application of the Shop Rule that failed to give proper weight to the extenuating circumstances of the case. It is ruled that the disciplinary layoff is to be reduced from two days to one day. 2. P. is to be provided with extra work, before his next seniority layoff or within six months, equivalent to that lost by him on the second day of his disciplinary layoff. If such work is not provided within six months of the issuance date of this decision, P. shall receive back wages for the day in question. (Entire Decision should be read)
In the Matter of: United Automobile Workers of America -- C.I.O. -- Local No. 455. and General Motors Corporation -- Saginaw Malleable Iron Division – Case No. 1-B.
Employee P. presented the following grievance on August 20, 1941: "Unfair penalty -- I ask that I be paid for two days that I was unfairly penalized." A hearing on the matter was held in Detroit on November 26, 1941.
Nature of Case and Claims of the Parties The disciplinary lay-off in this case was imposed because of an employee's failure to report, in a timely manner, his inability to get to work. Operations at this plant are on a continuous basis. In years past, employee absences were too numerous. This resulted in an undue loss of production and in excessive losses in employment to other employees. Management and the Shop Committee agreed, therefore, that a two day lay-off penalty would be imposed upon any employee who failed to report by his lunch period that he would be unable to come to work. Management states this rule has been effective in meeting the above-described problem. It is also stated that reason has been exercised in the imposition of the mentioned penalty. Allowances have been made in cases where it has later been shown to have been impossible for the required notice to be given. Employee P. works in the core-cleaning department on a shift which begins at 6:30 A.M. and which has a lunch period from 10:45 A.M. to 11:24 A.M. Under the above-mentioned understanding, which forms the basis of Shop Rule No. 8, an absence of P. should be reported no later than 11:24 A.M. On Monday August 11, 1941, P. called the plant at 12:20 P.M. and reported that he would be unable to come to work because the wires in his car were wet and the car would not start. The Union notes that this condition of his car was discovered when P. started for work at the regular time. It is said that P. "lives several miles out in the country" and that there was no available means of notifying the plant until the car had been repaired and used by P. to get to a telephone. The Union says the car was gotten in running order about 11:30 A.M. or 12:00 Noon when P., and his brother, immediately drove into town and phoned the plant at about 12:20 P.M. Management contends that the delay in calling the plant represents negligence on P.'s part since there are numerous telephones available within a short distance of P.'s home. Management feels that "any man living within eight miles of the plant, if he thought very much of his job, could certainly notify us within five hours." It is urged that proper compliance with Shop Rule No. 8 was actually quite feasible and that P.'s negligence in failing to comply with it represented a violation. It appears that, after calling the plant, P. had teeth extracted. On August 12 he reported to the Personnel Department in person and stated that, because of the extraction of his upper teeth, he would be off for several more days. When he returned to work on Friday, August 15, 1941 he was given two days disciplinary lay-off for not reporting his absence on Monday, August 11, 1941 by lunch time on his shift. This failure was construed by Management as a violation of Shop Rule No. 8 which reads:
Management contends that P. violated the rule and that the disciplinary lay-off was a proper penalty to be imposed by management by virtue of its rights under Paragraph 8 of the June 3, 1941 Agreement. The Union maintains that the lay-off of P. was inequitable because "he made an honest effort to comply with the rule and that the rule itself, which was originally designed to correct a particular situation in the foundry, should not be enforced when the evidence shows that a sincere attempt at observance has been made." The Union notes that the claimant in this case called at 12:20 for himself and for his brother who also works at the Malleable Iron Plant. The application of the rule meant that the claimant was penalized while his brother was not "because his lunch hours on occasions extended past 12:20 P.M." Contrary to a Management contention, the Union does not feel that the basic principle embodied in the rule is being challenged in the present case. The Union contends, however, that good judgment must be exercised in applying the rule. It calls attention to the fact "that this rule has been in force since the summer of 1937 and that, until the last four months, good judgment has been used in enforcing it." The Union goes on to say "prior to that time only one lay-off was protested by the Shop Committee although a number of people had been given time off for not making a reasonable effort to notify the plant when absent." In the present case, the Union maintains that P. made a sincere effort to comply with the rule and should not have been penalized. The Union emphasizes that reasonable excuses have resulted in a modification of the penalty under discussion and that Management erred in not recognizing P.'s excuse as a reasonable explanation. It is requested that P. be compensated for all lost time and that the rule be modified so that a reasonable excuse will be accepted in the future. Opinion and Decision of the Umpire The Shop Rule in question has unquestionably been applied, not in a rigid manner, but in recognition of the fact that circumstances may make it impossible for an absent employee to notify the plant strictly as required. In such cases, the prescribed penalty has been modified by Management. Management feels strongly that it was by no means impossible for P. who lived within eight miles of the plant, to get word of his absence to the plant within five hours. It is said there are numerous phones available in the neighborhood. There is no doubt that P. did not go out of his way to get word to the plant. On the other hand, P. did not entirely disregard his obligations to notify the plant since he did call the plant from the first public telephone to which he had access after his car had been repaired. He violated the shop rule in notifying the plant at the first convenient opportunity rather than at the earliest possible opportunity. The Umpire is of the opinion that the penalty imposed upon P. was at least partially related to his later absences that were incident to dental care, a fact that was not clearly brought out in certain earlier consideration to the case. With such absences adequately accounted for, it does not seem that P. should have been subjected to the same kind of a penalty that would have been imposed had he ignored the Shop Rule completely and failed to take any steps at all to notify the plant. His error was that the notification was about one hour late. It is concluded, then, that the two day disciplinary lay-off represented a rigid application of the Shop Rule without taking into account any of the extenuating circumstances of the case. On the other hand, the employee did not make as complete an effort to notify the plant as would be required in order to effect entire compliance with the Shop Rule. In view of these factors, the Umpire holds that the disciplinary lay-off penalty should be reduced from two days to one day. It is also held that before his next seniority layoff and within six months, P. shall be given extra work equivalent to that lost on the second day of his disciplinary lay-off. If such work is not provided within six months, P. shall receive back wages for the day in question.
Decision
Signed GEORGE W. TAYLOR, UMPIRE. December 4, 1941. |