|
|
|
OFFICE OF THE UMPIRE No. B-138 April 10, 1941
Disciplinary Layoff
GRIEVANCE: Saginaw Malleable Iron -- Case B-11 "Arbitrary enforcement of shop rule No. 8. I ask that I not be given time off under the above rule."
Umpire's Decision:
In the Matter of: United Automobile Workers of America -- C.I.O. Local 455 and General Motors Corporation -- Saginaw Malleable Iron Division – Case B-11
On December 17, 1941, Employee H. presented a grievance which read: "Arbitrary enforcement of shop rule No. 8. I ask that I not be given time off under the above rule." A hearing on this matter was held in Flint on March 26, 1942.
Nature of Case On December 11, 1941, Employee H. found it necessary to be away from his job and failed to call in before his lunch hour. Management held that this failure to call was a violation of shop rule No. 8 which reads: "Failure to call in or report by lunch time of shift on which absence occurs. (Two days to discharge.)" As a result, Management assessed the minimum penalty of two days' layoff against H., but the Union objected to this penalty on the grounds that a representative of Management, as late as June 10, 1941, stated that, "if a man called in any time during his shift, rule No. 8 would be considered complied with." The Union contends that inasmuch as H. called in during the afternoon of the shift from which he was absent, he complied with the interpretation of rule No. 8 as advanced by a member of supervision. Union Claim The Union notes that the excerpts of a meeting held between Management and the Shop Committee on June 10, 1941, in which the content and application of rule No. 8 was discussed, show that the presiding representative of Management made the statement: "We have thrashed that over and have been agreed that as long as the man calls in on his shift it will be O.K." The Union holds that this statement represents a qualification of rule No. 8 that must continue to be operative unless specifically changed through negotiations between Management and the Shop Committee. The Union contends, therefore, that there is a definite misunderstanding between Management and the Shop Committee as to what represents compliance with shop rule No. 8. The Union notes that the circumstances in this case are almost identical with those considered by the Umpire in Decision B-45, in which it was ruled that Management's action represented such a rigid enforcement of the rule that back pay was awarded to the employee involved. In the present instance, the Union states that H. attempted to inform the Company of his absence, although he called in at 12:20 P.M., just 20 minutes later than noted in the rule. The Union insists that Management in this particular instance failed to consider that if the rule as written was violated, it was rather a technical infraction. The Union notes that since Management has insisted on an exact interpretation of rule No. 8 as written, it has made several proposals to change the rule. One of these proposals was to incorporate what the Union considered a modification of the rule by a representative of Management on June 10, 1941, namely, to permit employees to call in any time during their respective shifts. When Management objected to this change in the rule, the Union further notes that it proposed that the rule be changed to read: "reprimand -- first offense; two days' layoff -- second offense." After failing to reach an agreement on any of these proposals, the Union still further notes that it "asked that some discretion be used in enforcing the rule." To settle the instant dispute, the Union requests that the Umpire recognize the statement which the Union claims was made by a representative of Management on June 10, 1941, as an effective qualification of rule No. 8, and that this decision be made the vehicle for a final ruling on the content and interpretation of that rule. Finally, the Union asks that H. be reimbursed for the two-day disciplinary layoff on the grounds that this layoff resulted from Management's arbitrary position in regard to Rule No. 8.
Corporation Position Management notes that the shop rules at this plant have been in effect for several years, are posted in conspicuous places throughout the plant, and that every employee has been given a copy of these rules as recently as June 27, 1941. Management contends that since H. did not call in by his lunch hour, and presented no extenuating circumstances in explanation of his failure to comply with rule No. 8, it was quite proper to invoke the minimum penalty of a two-day layoff. The shop rules in effect at this plant, Management states, "have existed for some time as one of the means of enabling Management to maintain the efficiency and proper attendance of employees." The particular rule here in question is claimed by Management to be in no sense a violation of any provision of the June 3, 1941 Agreement. Decision B-45 is cited by Management as evidence that the Umpire has considered rule No. 8, and has interpreted it as being in full force and effect as written. The findings in that decision are reasoned by Management to support the rule here questioned, and to note only that the rule should not be applied so rigidly as to fail entirely "to give proper weight to the extenuating circumstances of the case."
Observation and Decision of the Umpire The entire history of rule No. 8 at this plant is replete with evidence of attempts to enforce the rule with a recognition of the fact that existing circumstances may make it impossible for a particular employee to notify the plant of his absence within the exact time provided in the rule. In Decision B-45 there was noting cited as to the content of the rule itself, but it was particularly stressed that the rule had been applied in the past with full recognition of extenuating circumstances of each individual case. The Union has noted that a representative of Management on June 10, 1941, made a statement which it claimed changed the content of the rule and waived the necessity for employees to call in by lunch hour. The Umpire wishes to note the complete question and answer that concerned this matter, to indicate the full meaning of the statement of Management's representative. The excerpts of the meeting between Management and the Shop Committee held on June 10, 1941, show that Committeeman F. asked the following question concerning rule No. 8: "Isn't this the rule: If an employee lays off and does not call in before noon and does not have a satisfactory reason for laying off he is given two days off?" To this question a representative of Management replied: "I think so. We have thrashed that over and have been agreed that as long as the man calls in on his shift it will be O.K." The question as placed by Committeeman F. did not seek approval of a change in the rule from that which was written, but was directed toward an understanding as to its application. The question of Committeeman F. specifically included a recognition of the need to call in by lunch time, and the affirmative answer to that question indicated approval of the Committeeman's interpretation of the rule including the need to call in by lunch time. The second part of the answer, when directed to the question as placed, can mean only that an explanation of extenuating circumstances that prevented an employee from calling in by his lunch time, if advanced some time during his shift, will be accepted by Management as a reasonable fulfillment of rule No. 8. There was absolutely no agreement to waive the requirement that employees call in by lunch time. The Umpire is of the firm conviction, therefore, that rule No. 8 is still effective as written, and that Management has only agreed to qualify that rule to the extent of applying it in recognition of the particular circumstances involved in each particular case. The requirement that an employee call in by lunch time on the days he must be absent is still in effect, as is the penalty for failure to abide by that requirement. However, as noted above, there has been agreement that the rule will be applied in recognition of the circumstances surrounding each particular case. By its request in this case, the Union is really seeking to have the Umpire change rule No. 8 to a form that it has been unsuccessful in getting Management to agree to for some time past. The Umpire obviously has no right to change the rule in question, nor can he reinterpret it in a manner that would make that part of the rule requiring calling in by lunch time entirely inoperative. The two parties have been unable to agree on a change in the rule, and the Umpire's position cannot be used to force such an agreement on either party. In the particular case of H. cited in this grievance, no compelling reasons have been advanced for his failure to call in by his lunch time. The only explanation made was that he understood the rule to mean that he would call in any time during his shift. Ignorance of the rule, or of its full content, cannot be supported as an extenuating circumstance for H.'s failure to call in by lunch time on December 11, 1941. In the absence of reasonable qualifying circumstances, the two-day disciplinary layoff imposed on H. represented proper application of rule No. 8. The Union's request for the reimbursement of H. for the two-day layoff, therefore, must be denied.
Decision
Signed G. ALLAN DASH, JR., UMPIRE. April 10, 1942. |