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OFFICE OF THE UMPIRE No. C-35 April 20, 1943
Disciplinary Layoff
GRIEVANCES: Saginaw Malleable—Cases C-9 and C-10 "I ask that I be returned to work at once and paid for all time lost." "I ask that I be returned to work at once and that I be paid for all time lost."
Umpire’s Decision:
In the Matter of: United Automobile Workers of America—C.I.O. Local 455 and General Motors Corporation—Saginaw Malleable Division—Cases C-9 and C-10
Two employee grievances have been combined for consideration in this single decision because of the likeness of the issue involved. The first was presented by Employee B. on November 30, 1942, and reads: "I ask that I be returned to work at once and paid for all time lost." The second grievance, which was presented by Employee J. on December 1, 1942, reads "I ask that I be returned to work at once and that I be paid for all time lost." A hearing on these two matters was held in Detroit on March 19, 1943. Nature of Case and Claims of Parties Employees B. and J. were told by their superintendent on the Wednesday before Thanksgiving to report on Friday, November 27, 1942, the plant being closed on Thanksgiving Day. Neither of these employees reported to work, though telephone calls were received on the morning of November 27, 1942, concerning both of their cases. A representative of the Personnel Department called at B.’s home and was told that no one there had any knowledge of B.’s whereabouts. Another representative called at J.’s home to investigate J.’s absence and found no one at home. The unexcused absences of the two men necessitated the use of a group leader on an overtime basis to complete work these two men were expected to perform. Because of the absences, Management imposed a nine-day layoff on B. and an eight-day layoff on J. The two grievances that are the subject of this decision were filed in protest of these layoffs. Management submits that no permission was granted for the absence in either instance. Though telephone calls were received in both cases, Management contends that a telephone call in itself does not constitute an excused absence "since it is a primary obligation of employment for all employees to report for work when work is available unless they have been excused or advanced a satisfactory reason for such absence". The disciplinary layoffs, Management states were imposed "for failure to meet a condition of their employment, that of being present when work was available or being properly excused, and for failure to follow the specific instructions of their supervision". Discipline of this nature is contended by Management to be within the meaning of Paragraph 8 of the October 19, 1942 Agreement. The Union protests Management’s disciplinary action in these cases upon the grounds that both employees had telephone calls made for them to report their absences to the plant, and that they thereby complied with the plant rules requiring an employee to report his absence before lunch time. The Union admits that neither of the men were home at the time the representative of the Personnel Department called, but strongly contends that these single isolated absences did not violate any plant rule for which they could be subjected to discipline. Upon the grounds that these layoffs represented unjust penalties, the Union requests that both of the men be reimbursed for all time lost. Conclusions and Decision of the Umpire At the hearing on these layoff questions, the parties cited various shop rules which should be noted for purposes of this decision. Four of these shop rules are quoted below:
The first three of the shop rules quoted above may be said to anticipate that absences may occur, and set up limits within which discipline will be invoked if such absences happen under specified sets of circumstances. It must be noted that the absences of B. and J. on the day in question did not violate any of these shop rules inasmuch as telephone calls were received at the plant within the proper time, the one day did not represent three days of absence without notification, and no claim has been made that the two men were habitually absent without reasonable cause. Obviously single days of unexcused absences occur at this plant without penalty; it is only when these unexcused absences total three consecutive days without notification, or become habitual, that a penalty has been ordinarily imposed. Management’s contention that the failure of these two men to be present on the day in question represented a "refusal to obey orders of... supervision" is not a tenable reason for upholding the disciplinary action taken in these cases. To give support to such a contention would be to extend the shop rules on absences at this plant to all sorts of situations. Obviously such an extension of these shop rules would go far beyond their ordinary application. Of particular significance to the disposition of this case is the fact that Management failed to present its major contention throughout the entire grievance procedure. At the hearing on this question it became clear that Management had originally learned that there was to be a joint effort on the part of all of the men in B. and J.’s group to remain away from work on November 27, 1942. Had Management assessed its discipline in this matter on the grounds that there was an organized "stay-at-home" that amounted to a form of stoppage of work, there would have been real reason to support Management in its position—in fact it is highly probable that any reasonable proof of such a situation would have prevented the matter from proceeding very far through the grievance machinery. Local Management’s failure to present its real contention in this matter, then, causes it to be responsible for the case being considered and evaluated on other grounds. That the strength of Management’s position in the assessment of the discipline here being tested is much weakened by such a procedure should be obvious. Inasmuch as the Umpire fails to find any tenable point in Management’s position that Employees B. and J. were guilty of violating existing shop rules, it is necessary to hold that the two men were unjustly disciplined. It follows that both men on the basis of this reasoning are entitled to receive reimbursement for the number of days each of them was disciplined. Such reimbursement is directed to be made by May 1, 1943.
Decision
Signed G. ALLAN DASH, JR. UMPIRE April 20, 1943. |