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Office of the Umpire No. C-250 OCTOBER 3, 1944
Time Limit In Filing Grievances
GRIEVANCE: Eastern Aircraft—Linden—Case C-737 "I have been discharged unjustly. I request to be reinstated and paid for all time lost."
Umpire’s Decision: The grievance is dismissed as not having been filed within the time limit specified in Paragraph 77 of the Agreement. (Entire Decision should be read)
In the Matter of: United Automobile Workers of America—C.I.O.—Local 595 and General Motors Corporation—Eastern Aircraft—Linden—Case C-737
The only issue presented to the Umpire in this case is whether or not the grievance was filed within the time limit set by Paragraph 77 of the Agreement. Employee R. was discharged on June 30, 1944, for habitual absenteeism. On June 1, 1944, Management sent a telegraphic notification of her discharge to the address listed for her on its records. The telegram was accepted by someone at that address on July 2, 1944. On July 5, Employee R. reported for work and was orally notified of her discharge. The present grievance was filed on July 7. Management claims that as the grievance was filed more than three working days after her discharge, it is invalid within the meaning of Paragraph 77 of the Contract. Employee R. states that from June 21 to June 25, and again from June 28 to June 30, she was ill with appendicitis. Prior to her illness, she asserts, she had moved from her former residence with her parents and had notified a girl in the Personnel Office of her change of address. She states further that as she had learned that on the first four days of July the Plant was going to be closed for the purposes of taking inventory she did not report for work until July 5th. As she did not receive the telegram which was sent to her parents’ home, the first notice she had of her discharge came when she reported to work on the 5th. Under these circumstances, therefore, she claims that by filing the grievance on July 7, she came within the three-day time limit established by Paragraph 77. In support of her claim the Union originally argued that the oral notice of her change of address which she claims to have given the Personnel Department should have been treated as sufficient to place upon the Management the responsibility for the misdirection of the telegram. It seems to have become clear during the discussions of the case in the earlier stages of the grievance machinery, however, that R. did not follow the regular procedures established by the Management for the recording of a change of address, and that she thereby failed to discharge the responsibility placed upon her by Paragraph 74 of the Agreement. In its brief to the Umpire, therefore, the Union appears to have abandoned that point and to rest its case upon the contention that since the Plant was closed for inventory purposes from July 1 to July 4, those days should not be counted as "working days" within the meaning of Paragraph 77. Management points out, however, that a large number of employees were scheduled to work on the days in question in the taking of the inventory and that at this plant all days are considered regular working days, except Sundays and holidays. It concedes that Sunday, July 2, and Tuesday, July 4, were not regular working days and should not be counted. Had R. filed her grievance on July 5 when she received oral notification of her discharge, it might well have been honored as falling within the three-day time limit. Employee R., however, delayed another two days before filing her grievance and thereby exceeded the time limit. This Plant has been operating on a regular 48-hour week for approximately two years. All days except Sundays or the holidays specified in the Agreement have been customarily considered and treated as working days. Had the Plant shut down completely for a few days, of course, it might well be argued that the days on which it was closed were not working days. It appears, however, that the taking of inventory did not mean a complete shutdown of the Plant. Some 900 employees were working in connection with the inventory, including a number of Union Committeemen and supervisory officials. The interruption of operations was not sufficiently complete to take these days out of the definition of "working days" in Paragraph 77 of the Agreement. The Umpire has previously held that the contractual provisions with respect to the grievance machinery must be construed in the light of the fundamental purposes of the grievance machinery; i.e., to provide a means whereby grievances can be decided on their merits. This principle cannot be carried, however, to the point at which the provisions of the Agreement are disregarded or their plain meaning ignored. The Umpire finds that July 1 and July 3 were working days within the meaning of Paragraph 77 of the Agreement. He finds that Employee R. was herself responsible for the misdirection of the telegram and for the two-day delay in filing the grievance which followed her oral notification on July 5. Whatever may be the merits of her grievance she has lost her right to bring it, and for that loss she has only herself to blame. The Umpire will dismiss the grievance as not filed within the time limit specified in Paragraph 77 of the Agreement.
Decision The grievance is dismissed as not having been filed within the time limit specified in Paragraph 77 of the Agreement. Signed, Ralph T. Seward UMPIRE October 3, 1944. |