OFFICE OF THE UMPIRE

No. C-369

June 25, 1945

 

Appeal From A Disciplinary Layoff

 

GRIEVANCE:

Saginaw Malleable Iron Division—Case C-8

"Ask everyone to work on December 17, 1944 but me. I am requesting pay for that day."

"Was laid off for failure to report on December 17, 1944."

"This man was penalized two days after calling committeeman on grievance. Charge discrimination for Union activity and violation of Par. 6 of Agreement. Request pay for time lost."

 

Umpire’s Decision:

The grievance is dismissed. (Entire Decision should be read)

 

In the Matter of:

United Automobile Workers of America—C.I.O.—Local 579

and

General Motors Corporation—Saginaw Malleable Iron Division—Case C-8

 

In the first of these grievances, Employee C. claims that he was unfairly denied an opportunity to work on Sunday, December 17th, 1944, and asks pay for that day. In the second and third grievances he claims that he was not told to come to work on December 17th and that a two-day penalty given him for failing to appear or call in on that day was unjust. He asks back pay for the two days he was penalized.

The sole issue in this case is whether or not on Saturday, December 16th, C. was instructed to come to work on the following day. It is agreed that on Saturday afternoon, when Superintendent H. informed the other employees that they were to come to work on Sunday, C. was absent in the men’s washroom. The Superintendent testifies, however, that he thereafter found C. in the aisle by the drinking fountain, and expressly told him to come to work the next day, adding that he should make a point of being there because the pay for that Sunday’s work would be included in his Christmas pay check.

The Superintendent states further that at about 9:00 A.M. on Monday morning, December 18th, he spoke to C. and asked him why he had not been to work on the previous day. C. replied that he had not been told to come to work. The Superintendent reminded him of the conversation by the drinking fountain and told him that he would probably receive a two-day penalty.

Because it was filed at 10:25 A.M., after this conversation, Management interprets C.’s first grievance as being merely a defensive move made in an effort to escape the two-day penalty. Later in the day, after the Superintendent had checked the records to be sure that C. had not called in on Sunday to explain his absence, C. was informed that his penalty was in effect and that he should take the next two days off. The filing of the second and third grievances followed.

For his part, C. denies having any conversation whatsoever with Superintendent H. on Saturday, December 16th. He likewise denies that he saw the Superintendent Monday morning before he filed his first grievance. According to C., the two-day penalty was decided on by the Superintendent only after he had "placed the Superintendent on the spot" by complaining about the Superintendent’s failure to tell him to come to work on Sunday. It was, says the Union, a defensive move on the part of the Superintendent to cover up his own administrative lapse.

The case, therefore, comes down to a straight question of the Umpire’s judgment of the comparative credibility of Employe C. and Superintendent H. He found little to choose between them as regards their attitude and demeanor while testifying. Each side was equally vehement in asserting its confidence in the integrity of its own witness and its distrust of the opposing witness. The truth or falsity of their respective claims regarding the alleged conversation at the drinking fountain on Saturday, December 16th, can therefore be judged only indirectly through testing the accuracy of their testimony on other matters.

So tested, the dispute must be resolved in favor of Management. An affidavit by Foreman M. definitely corroborates the Superintendent’s claim that he discussed the matter with C. on Monday morning before C. called his Committeeman and filed the first grievance. C.’s unsupported testimony to the contrary, therefore, must be rejected. C.’s claim, moreover, that he discussed the matter with the Chairman of the Shop Committee at 10:15 A.M. prior to the filing of his first grievance at 10:25 A.M. has also been shown to be untrue. The discussion, C. said, took place during the lunch period while the men were waiting in line in the cafeteria. Management’s records, however, establish that the last tap out before lunch that day was at 10:22 A.M. It takes a few minutes after the last tap out before the molten iron is completely poured and the men are ready to go to lunch. Unless both men left their jobs early that day, they could hardly have had time to discuss the question before the grievance was filed at 10:25 A.M.

These discrepancies may seem to have little relevance to the merits of the case. They are, however, of direct relevance to the question of credibility. Having found that C.’s testimony on these minor matters was false, the Umpire must resolve the main issue of credibility against him and conclude that he was in fact told to come to work on Sunday as the Superintendent alleged. These grievances must accordingly be dismissed.

In fairness to the International Union and the Local Shop Committee, the Umpire must state that he finds in the evidence no reason to believe that they were aware of the inaccuracies in C.’s story. Though the Umpire has decided the issue against them he believes that both the International and Local Union officials acted in this matter in entire good faith.

 

 

Decision

The grievance is dismissed.

Signed, Ralph T. Seward

UMPIRE

June 25, 1945.


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