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OFFICE OF THE UMPIRE No. E-68 FEBRUARY 19, 1947
Claim Of Improper Promotion
GRIEVANCE: Chevrolet-Toledo Division—Case E-19 "I am protesting violation of Paragraph 63 of the March 19, 1946 Agreement. I am asking credit for time as being on job from date of violation. I did not receive answer to application. A few years ago when this younger man in point of seniority was placed on higher rated job in gear lab. I filed a grievance and according to Paragraph 63 of that contract I lost the grievance. According to the present contract Paragraph 63 I am entitled to the job and made application for same and received no answer. I am charging discrimination for union activity as I had previous experience plus 21 years seniority."
Umpire’s Decision: The grievance is dismissed. (Entire Decision should be read)
In the Matter of: United Automobile Workers of America—C.I.O.—Local 14 and General Motors Corporation Chevrolet-Toledo Division—Case E-19 On June 10th, 1941, Employee B., seniority date April 30, 1941, was promoted from the "Bench Inspection" classification to the "Gear Laboratory Inspector" classification at a five cent increase in rate. In this grievance, another Bench Inspector, Employee M., seniority date May 7, 1926, claims that he is equal or superior to B. in ability, merit and capacity and that in view of his longer seniority he was entitled to the promotion under Paragraph 63 (a) of the National Agreement. This is the second time that B. has been promoted from "Bench Inspector" to "Gear Laboratory Inspector" over M.’s protest. At the time of B.’s first promotion, in May, 1944, M. filed a grievance alleging, among other things, that he was being discriminated against for Union activity. It appears, however, that he failed to support this claim by written evidence as required by Paragraph 63. The grievance was therefore settled upon the basis of Management’s Answer, and B. was continued as a "Gear Laboratory Inspector" until September, 1945, when he was demoted to the "Bench Inspection" classification because of a reduction in force. Management claims that the question of the relative ability, merit and capacity of these two men was settled once and for all when the Union failed to process this earlier grievance through to the Umpire. Even disregarding the fact that the earlier settlement was occasioned by a procedural defect in the Union’s case, this would not be true. The ability, merit and capacity of individuals are not static. Even if both parties had agreed that M. was inferior to B. in 1944, it would not necessarily follow that he was still inferior in 1946. To uphold this phase of Management’s argument would be to negate the possibility of a man’s improving himself by study, training and the acquisition of new skills. The settlement of this earlier grievance, however, did have the effect of establishing B.’s first promotion as contractually proper and of enabling Management to offer the experience in the Gear Laboratory which B. gained thereby, as evidence of his present superior ability. In view of that evidence, the Umpire must find that B.’s latest promotion was not a violation of M.’s rights under Paragraph 63. M. had not worked in the Gear Laboratory since 1936. B.’s more recent experience in the laboratory, rendered him thoroughly familiar with current designs and methods. Whereas B. was in a position to perform the work satisfactorily immediately upon his promotion, M. could hardly have taken over the job without additional training or breaking in. As the Umpire pointed out in Decision C-149, evidence of recent successful performance on the job cannot be discounted in promotion cases. During the earlier discussions of this case in the Grievance Procedure, the Union advanced as an additional argument the fact that M. had applied for transfer to the "Gear Laboratory Inspector" classification and that he was therefore entitled to the promotion not only under Paragraph 63 (a) but also under 63 (b). In Decision E-44, however, the Umpire held that as between seniority employees, Paragraph 63 (b) could apply to promotions only in the unlikely event that all of the candidates had the same seniority dates and were equal in ability, merit and capacity. Had B. filed an application it would not have offset M.’s greater seniority. Employee M.’s application, similarly, could not offset B.’s superior ability, merit and capacity. This case is governed by Paragraph 63 (a) alone, and the provisions of that Paragraph have not been violated by the promotion. Decision: The grievance is dismissed.
Signed, Ralph T. Seward UMPIRE February 19, 1947. |